India and Pakistan have come a long way, witnessing several highs and lows in bilateral relations. Claims by both successor nations to the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir have resulted in a half- century of bitter relations that has included four wars: in 1947- 48, 1965, 1971 and 1999. The euphoria that followed the Feb. Lahore declarations by India and Pakistan abruptly dissipated when nearly 1500 Pakistan- backed Muslim Militants crossed the LOC and infiltrated six miles into the India-held Kargil region of North Kashmir. And it gave emergence to the Kargil war between India and Pakistan. It was the fourth large scale conflict between the two countries. Pakistan crossed the LOC and occupied the heights above Kargil with the objective to interdict the Kargil-Ladakh highway and isolate Indian forces in Leh, the support base for Indian troops in Siachen, and thereby facilitate their later eviction. To emphasize that the LOC was essentially a temporary border and to elicit a violent Indian reaction, which would alarm the international community and feed into its fears that the Kashmir conflict could escalate out of control and reach a nuclear flash point? From India’s perspective, Pakistan failed to secure these objectives except for managing to internationalize the Kashmir dispute-but in a way that lost its international support. The international community condemned Pakistan’s evident violation of the LOC, an action that could have sparked an even greater conflict. The United States called its actions unprovoked and unjustified, as did the G-8 countries, which viewed “any military action to change the status (of the LOC) as irresponsible. Ultimately with the intervention of U.S President Bill Clinton Pakistan withdraw its forces from kargil region.
Events in Pakistan have come full circle with the Musharraf’s return to power in Oct.1999, as the final arbiter of countries destiny. The removal of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif by General Parvaiz Musharraf, has flung Pakistan’s nascent democracy into turmoil and uncertainty. He appointed himself as the chief executive and suspended the constitution and National Assembly and declared a state of emergency in Pakistan. He accused Sharif’s Government of systematically destroying state institutions and deriving the economy towards collapse. Musharraf has pushed through numerous legislative initiatives, relying on constitutional manipulation and electoral rigging to retain power. These initiatives, under the pretext of transitioning to democracy, were intended to render the Prime Minister powerless and reduce parliament to a bureaucratic rubber stamp. Musharraf’s roadmap to democracy was in reality a blueprint for more military rule. After, the Kargil war the relationship between India and Pakistan worsened considerably, particularly because Musharraf had been the prime architect of the Kargil operation. And he is also called Mr. Kargil in India. Musharraf’s anti India policies were high jacking of Indian plane, declaring Kashmir as a core issue and supporting cross border terrorism. He used America’s aid in anti-India activities in Kashmir and other parts of India. He demonstrates the mindset of an assertive, theologically committed military figure having long-standing links with several Islamic fundamentalist groups.
The Vajpayee-Musharraf summit at Agra held on the 15th and 16th July was anticipated with high hopes and expectations. But it barely managed to ensure the continuity of the dialogue that had reopened after a gap of more than two and a half years. Since the October 1999 Military Coup of General Musharraf, India had continued to refuse the offer by Musharraf to have bilateral discussions( at any level, at any time and any place).Why then a sudden change of policy resulting in an invitation on 24 May 2001 to Parvaiz Musharraf to come to India for a Summit. It was L. K. Advani and other senior cabinet colleagues who advised Vajpayee to do something bold and dramatic in bilateral framework so that India and Pakistan could break out of the logjam since the Kargil war in 1999.The other reasons for this invitation were inherent in political developments in J&K. Vajpayee’s invitation of May 24th was accepted by Musharraf on May 27th. Dates for the summit were tentatively scheduled for mid- July, the summit ultimately took place between the 14th and 16th of July. Although widely anticipated as a possible breakthrough in India- Pakistan relations, the July Summit failed to produce a joint communiqué, reportedly as a result of pressure by hardliners on both sides. Major stumbling blocks were India’s refusal to acknowledge the “centrality of Kashmir” to future talks and Pakistan’s objection to references to “cross-border terrorism”. In short, the way the Agra Summit ended saddened many. But rather than mourning reality, let us learn to accept it. The fact is that traditional adversaries cannot become friends overnight. First, they have to stop behaving enemies. That can only happen when the killing of each other’s troops will be stopped and fomenting troubles for each lessened. They should start acting trustworthily.
As the two south Asian nuclear rivals, India and Pakistan, step into an ‘era of peace’ things have started to change. They sent a clear message to the world that they have serious intentions to resolve their conflicts. They realized the risks of derailing the peace process through the politics of confrontation and understand the benefits if they move in the direction of peace-building. In the sixty years of their existence as independent states, India and Pakistan took 50 years-half a century-to develop a process in 1997. In May 1997, in Male, capital of the Maldives, on the sideline of SAARC summit, Indian Prime minister Inder Kumar Gujral and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif mooted the idea of a structured dialogue or the Comprehensive Dialogue Process (CDP). Both the leaders agreed to start a dialogue on eight baskets of issues. What exactly is a peace process? A peace process is a mechanism or a set of negotiations where the parties involved attempt to avoid war or a war like-situation and wish to settle conflicts peacefully by using techniques such as diplomacy, tradeoffs and mediation. Peace is considered as an end in itself and such techniques are used to achieve that end. The peace process between India and Pakistan was affected by the acts of terrorism indirectly supported by Pakistan like kargil war, parliament attacks, Mumbai train blasts and the inefficient policies of Parvaiz Musharraf. There are some entrenched factors that have historically impacted on the India-Pakistan ‘peace process’ and limited the ability of both nations to conclude significant and meaningful agreements that would improve and further their relationship. There are (at least) three entrenched factors: first, the need for strong, popular, conciliatory and decisive leadership concurrently in both nations to make appropriate agreements on divisive issues; second, the need for strong public support in both nations to push for such agreements and then to enable any agreements made to be implemented, particularly in relation to the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir; and, third, the need to overcome the so-called ‘trust deficit’ that exists between both nations and many of their people. These factors are related. None has yet been overcome to allow the India-Pakistan ‘peace process’ to progress beyond what currently appears to an ongoing, slow and steady pace of consultations. This situation appears unlikely to change in the short term.
The end result of the Kargil experience is that Indian public opinion is clear that Pakistan will continue its hostile activities against India and that India had to remain permanently alert. I view more Kargil wars might crop up if India remains adamant on Kashmir issue and failed to resolve it in a just and fair manner. Prime Minister of Pakistan rightly said on 12th July 1999 in Pakistan National Assembly: “Though the volcanic eruption in Kargil has been brought under control, if India doesn’t discuss Kashmir in meaningful manner, other volcanoes will erupt”. It is the admitted fact that regional stability and progress depends upon India-Pakistan peace. Leaders of the two countries embrace much wider, larger, and longer strategic perspectives without sticking only to Kashmir as a national policy. When we view the Kashmir issue and the bilateral relationship from such an angle, the eagerness of leaders of the two countries to take initiative to tackle the issue during the past five years would be understandable to a certain degree. Moreover, the leaders have their own compulsion to cope with the Kashmir issue without giving any impression of selling out of national interests, and at the same time to draw concession from the other side. The study gives the view that 'the lack of progress on the issue of Kashmir and terrorism has emerged as the main challenge to the current peace process between India and Pakistan. The divergence of perception regarding desired outcome of the peace process in these two areas has not only slowed down the peace process but may also deadlock the dialogue process. A peace process could become meaningful only when an inclusive political dialogue involving even the militants would take place. In the last sixty two years the people of the Kashmir have been ignored in the dialogue on Kashmir. Even, they were not party to the Tashkent Declaration or the Simla Accord. The inclusion of the Kashmiris in the peace process is also very important for any solution of the conf1ict.
No comments:
Post a Comment